attested in Euripides 3 , Zeus made the sun reverse his course in order to demonstrate the priority of a rightful daim even to the prejudice of the cosmic order, in other words to validate the appalling maxim fiat iustitia, pereat mundus 4 . We may admit that "plato's real theological beliefs had little in common with the ancient religion"Sj but such a Zeus, so eager to interfere in human and cosmic affairs, looks really sympathetic to Plato's uncompromising ethical fundamentalism.
Prima fade the provident god (à OEOÇ), who (269 C 4-5) helps to guide the universe (ta 1tâv) in its motion and revolution (OUJ.l.1tOOllYE't 1t0PEÛIlEVOV KCÙ OUYKUKÂ-E'i), seems cognate to the watchful god of the Argive saga. If in fact it is tme that the germs of the Politicus myth are to be found in a presumably very old tradition, there Plato operates a significant shift of emphasis. In the time of Atreus the sun's change of direction took place following the god's active intervention. In Plato's phantasy the change in the movement of the whole (leading to changes in the movement of the parts, in primis the sun and the stars) occurs at the very moment that the god lets go the helm leaving the world to itself (269 C 5). So Plato's god seems to keep his distance from the Zeus of the standard Greek religion.
Let us now examine the activities that this god carries out in positive way (his intervention in this world), leaving for later the activities that he carries out in negative way (his non-intervention). God acts on the world in two stages. In the beginning he constructed (ouvapllooavtoç: 269 D D or fashioned (ouvOévtoç: 273 B) or even begot (YEvv~OaVtoç) the universe. To use a less anthropomorphic terminology, he gave order to it (Kooll~craç: 273 D 4). So he may be called "maker, creator" (Ol1llwuPyoç: 270 A 5) or even "creator and father" (273 B 1-2). During the first of the alternating world-periods, God accompanies the world in its forward revolution (269 C 4-5, cit. supra)j in other words God "controls with his providence the whole revolution" (tT\ç KUKMoeoç PXEV È1ttIlEÂ-OÛIlEVOÇ oÂ-l1ç: 271 D 3-4), while other gods or daemons mie over all the parts of the cosmos which are appointed to them (271 D -E D. The famous king Cronus of the legend was just one of the attendant gods and was in charge of men (Le. adult males without women or children) as "overseer"
and "shepherd"6. Consequently, God is rightly called the "pilot" or "steersman" of the universe ('toû 1tav'toç b Ku~epV~'tTlç: 272 E 4; cf. 273 C 3)7.
Let us now pass to God's negative activities, Le. the moment of his noninterference in the cosmic affairs. When the cycles of the time appointed to it have accomplished their measure God lets the universe go to its destiny (àvllKev: 269 C 5), with the result that it begins to revolve in the contrary direction, of itself (m'n6j.la'tov: 269 C 7). This back:ward revolution or rotation in reverse (àvaKuKÂ:IlO"tÇ) is providentia!ly "the smallest possible alteration of the motion which pertains to it" (269 E 2-3). Elaborating on the nautical metaphor, Plato represents this behaviour of the god as that of a helmsman retiring from the steering-tiller of his boat. We are not told the reasons of the helmsman's departure. Since he is not conditioned by any necessity -ananke or heimarmene--but only by the nature of his models -the Ideas-, it is a matter of conjecture if he is bored, tired, worried, or ... sleepy. This may seem an academical question, but in fact it touches on the crucial point, Le. the problem of God's freedom and/or responsibility in the government of this world. The following is the dramatic formulation of Plato's response to the mystety of God's attitude vis-à-vis the world. In the end God, the great steersman, "did retire into his watch-tower" (eiç 't~v oei.l'toû 1teptco1t~v : 272 D 5)8. This standoffish attitude of the demiurge, which has such upsetting effects on the macrocosmos, has an impact on the human microcosmos as weIl. As soon as the world is abandoned by the supreme god, men are bereft of the care of the daemon (presumably to be identified with Cronus) who had got them to keep and tend (274 B 5-6) and lose also the watch kept over them by the other inferior gods (274 D 3-4).
7 According to ADAM, art. clt. (n.3), p.446, the activities of the demlourgos and the kybernetes are in the last analysis coincident, that is, "the forward revolution of the universe... means nothing more of Jess than the creation of the world, I.e. its ordering out of chaos." According to Ch. MUGLER, La physique de Platon, Paris, 1960, p. 170 (cf. 173, 178 and 192 ) -a drastically reductionistic approach-the god of the Pollt/cus myth is a symbol "pour J'information structurale du monde et le pouvoir régulateur qu'elle exerce sur les forces diffuses de l'ananke". For What religio-historical interpretation is ta be given ta this rnyth of an alternate 9 withdrawal of God from the government of the world 10 ? Sorne scholars doubt that this story can be taken in earnest, at least at a higher philosophical level l1 • Such scepticism is unjustified, for this myth -like all rnyths-contains no dialectical truth in itself but leads to the truth in a protreptical and analogical way12. However linked ta the old tradition he rnight be (cf. 269 Band 271 B), Plato nonetheless produced mythicallore by hirnself (cf. 269 C) for his own purpose. The impact of Plata as a myth-maker on the subsequent eschatological, psychological, cosmonical doctrines is well known in the case of the Phaedo, the Phaedrus, the Timaeus. But even the Politicus rnyth had sorne reverberation on certain environments 13 For instance, the theme of the "cosrnetic" procedure that the returning god carries out on the decaying world may find a significant echo in Vergil's drearn of the returning golden age: adspice convexo nutantem pondere mundum, / (1958) [= Kleine Schriften, München, 1975, p. 328-3291 : K. GAISER, Plato/ls ungeschrtebene Lehre, Stuttgart, 1968 2 , p. 393, n. 178) , at the end of every cycle of backward revolution God "again takes up his post at the helm" (273 El), in order to restore the things which were gone the way of disease and dissolution during the time when the universe was left to itself.
10 For attempts at philosophical Interpretation see J.A. STEWART, 17Je Myths of Plata. London, 1905, p. 193-194 Bristol, 1992, p. 4 , emphasizes that "même lorsqu'il n'intervient pas directement, le dieu reste 'à la vigie': il ne quitte donc jamais le navire auquel est comparé l'univers". But his re-intervention at the helm of the cosmos (273 E 1-4) does not take place before that the present period Cthat of Zeus) closes. During this period -that is our historical aeon-God is not at the helm of the universe (pace BRISSON, art. cil. [no 10 ], p. 8 and passim), which proceeds by itself and is master of its own path (cf. 273 E 6 -274 A 8: ... Ku8ullEp~ii> Kocrll'P llpOcrE~ÉWK~O UÙ~OKPU~OpU dvui~fjç uu~oû llopduç, 01h00 01] Ka~à wi:>tà KU!~oÎç IlÉpEcrlV uùwÎç 01' UU~ÔlV, .... q>ÛEIV~E KU! YEVVaV KU!~pÉq>ElV llpOcrE~U~~E~O U1l0~fjç OIlOtUÇ ayooyfjç).
Il After Zeller, see esp. FRUTIGER, op. clt. (n. 7), p. 13, n. 2, p. 14, n. 1, p. 52, 167-168, 219, 220, n. 3, p. 279, 282 , and A.E. TAYLOR, "Introduction", in Plato, The Sophlsf and the Statesman, London, 1961, p. 208-209 17 . In the myth told in his Book Baruch Numenius' First God (the Idea of Good) corresponds to Justin's One above all, called the Good (6 à,yaS6ç), at one point identified with cosmic Priapusj while Numenius' Second God (the demiurge) finds his pendant in Justin's Father of aIl begotten things, called Elohim. The Good, though taking forethought for the universe (rcpoyvrocr'ttKàç -CÔN oÀrov: Hipp. Rej V, 26, 1), lives completely apart in a light palace at the upper limit of heaven (Hipp. Rej V, 26, 15) . Elohim, once he has created the world through mutual satisfaction following his copulation with Eden (= the Ealth, the Matter, or rather the world-soul), desires "to ascend to the highest parts of heaven and ta see if anything is lacking in the creation" (Hipp. Rej V, 26, 14) . Ultimately fallen under the control of the Good, Elohim is no longer able to and/or willing to descend to Eden -out of the metaphor he is decided to leave the world to itself (Hipp. Rej V, 26, 20) .
The gods of Justin -the former absent, the latter withdrawing from the world-are typieal representatives of the godhead as conceived in a gnostie ideology: unknown, remote or estranged l8 . More specifieally, both Elohim and the demiurge of Plato in the Politicus myth (as well as -to a lesser degreehis counterpart in the Timaeus myth) abandon their creation after having accomplished their task. So, from a broader comparative point of view, the gnostie god and the Platonic god may be considered characteristical examples of the phenomenologieal category of the deus otiosU~9. The type of the deus otiosus is in fact attested by extensive and world-wide evidence from the cults of non-literate peoples and -with sorne distinctions-even from the more developed pantheons of lndo-European and Semitie peoples 2o . The phenomenology of the so-called "high gods" was fjrstly outlined by the Lutheran historian and phenomenologist of religion N. Soderblom (Das Werden des Gottesglaubens, Leipzig 1916\ 1926 2 ), who also pointed out the connection between the otiositas of these creators and the stability of the cosmic order (compare the apparent paradox in the behaviour of Plato's demiurge vis-à-vis the world). The Supreme Beings are in fact personifications of an order which primitive man fjnds in the world. But the Supreme Being does not need to be concerned with it, as he has established everything perfectly ab antiquo. The mythieal past is more important than the present historical situation: as an archetype the former leads and mouIds the latter. Therefore the Supreme Being, creator of the world and founder of the laws and rites, takes on the attitude of deus otiosus, Le. of a god who, once he has defjned the fundamental principles of the cosmos, definitevely drops all interest in worldly affairs. This Being has ultimately only a second role in the religious life of mankind. This Heavenly Being is statie like the sky from whieh currently he takes his name, and in which he lives. He is a deus otiosus, who only now and there becomes animated owing to the uranian-meteorie phenomena: rain, wind, rainbow, thunder, lightning, thunderbolt, dew, fog, and hail. But this apparently impassive, languid and slothful Being is the creator and the first regulator of sky, earth, vegetation, and mankind: as aIl-seeing and aIl-knowing (and as guardian of the order set up by himself) he is also the chastiser of various human trangressions. In fact, this god is "otiose" only in comparison to the activism of minor deitiesj and his Indifference towards the human kind after creation is quite relative and does not impair his autority and primacy above aIl other gods. This apparently paradoxical otiositas might indeed belong to the essential nature of the Supreme Being and be in a way the complement of his creative activity. The world once made and the cosmos established, the creator's work is as good as done. Any further intervention on his part would be not only superfluous but possibly dangerous, since any change in the cosmos might aIlow it to faIl back into chaos. The otiositas of the creator is the most favourable condition and the one naturaIly best suited to maintain the status quo (Plato's view is remarkably the opposite).
After this synoptic presentation of phenomenological data pertaining to the typology of the deus otiosus, with special reference to the lore of non-lîterate peoples, we should be able to outline the traditional world-view or so-to-say the substratum upon which Plato constmcted his non-traditional representation.
God and the Evil in the world
In the last analysis, Plato advances the supposition of God's intermittent agency on this world in order to supply a cause (mythological, of course) for the existence of evil, both physical and moral, in a world supposed to be governed by a god altogether good, unresentful, and provident (cf. Tim. 29 E -30 B) . In other words, the Politicus myth, like the Timaeus (esp. and the Laws X (esp. 899-905) offers a solution to the problem of theodicy21. Plato, giving a thelogical reason for the existence of evil in light of the existence of God, who is good and -within the limits of convenience (ta 1tpOcrfjKOV: 269 C 6)-omnipotent, has not yet identified expressly the active cause of evil. In view of Plato's theodicy, the efficient cause of evil cannot in any case be attributed either to the action of God "creator and father,,22 or the counteraction of a sort of "antagonistic" god 23 . For Plato, the actual source of evil is in fact endogenous to the phenomenal world.
Let us now review the formulas that Plato employs in the Politicus myth to identify the source (or sources) of cosmic disorder which ultimately coincides with evil. According to Plato, disorder is symbolized by the retrogade motion of the universe. This backwards (avamû,tv) circuit "belongs of necessity to the nature of the universe" W; avaY1Cl1ç~1.llPU'tOV yéYOVE: 269 D 2-3), which is like an animal (çépov) "acting of itself" (au'to/-w/tQv: 269 C 7). The universe has of course been created good by the demiurge but "also partakes of body" (KEKOtVrovlllOE YE Kat (Hoj.la'toç: 269 D 9-10). As a consequence, when the cosmos is let go and "moves of itself" Gh' Éau'tQû athov Uvat: 270 A 5-6), it "proceeds in the contrary direction" (270 A 6-7). The reason because the cosmos started to revolve backwards is unambiguously asserted once again: it was an "impulse (or urge) decreed by fate and inborn" (fij.lapj.lévll 'tE Kat crUj.l<pu'tQç: 272 E 6). The ultimate source of this impulse lies in a factor which is a "thing reared toghether (cruv'tpo<poç) with the previous nature" (273 B 5), i.e. the "cbrporeal element of the mixture" ('to crffij.la'toEtoÈÇ 'tftç cruYKpacrEffiç: 273 B 4). Before that it came into the present order, the nature of things was in fact "partaking of much disorder" (1toÎl,ÎI,ftç... j.lE'téxov lX'taçtaç: 273 B 5-6). Thus, in the same way as aIl the good things of this world derive from the demiurge, aIl the harsh and unrighteous ones come from this previous state of ataxia . Therefore, after the separation of the universe from its creator, "oblivion" (MeT] : 273 C 6) grew by LASSERRE, ad loc., p. 254-256) and Aristote1es (fr. 6 Ross: cf. M. UNTERSTEINER, in Aristotele, Della fllosofla, Roma, 1963, p. 81-86; GAISER, op. clt. Paris, 1953, p. 100 , who pertinently remarks that in Plato's myth, "contrairement à la doctrine iranienne, la succession est cyclique, éternelle": and ID., in Les religions de l'O/ient ancien, Paris, 1957 (ital. transI. Catania, 1960 (Roma, 23 nov. 1985 ), Ferrara, 1986 more and more in it until "the influence of the ancient discord" ('Co 'Cfjç no:Â,o:tûç uVO:PI.!OCT'Cîo:ç nuEloç: 273 C 7 -D 1) prevailed.
So, at least in the Politicus myth, the ultimate source of evil is to be identified with corporeality, 'Co CHollO:'COEtOÉç, which for Plato (cf. Phd. 81 B 5; Resp. VII, 532 C 7; Tim. 31 B 5) is virtually equivalent to phenomenal reality. But neither is the corporeal as such coincident with the evil, nor does the evil originate from the corporeal in sll.4. The evil rather derives from a factor which is originally inherent in the precosmical reality -the ataxia 25 p. 189, 192, 193, 200, 202, 206, n. If we now l'aise the question "was Plato dualist in the Politicus myth", we should answer without hesitation in the affirmative. In this myth Plato postulates in an unequivocaHy dualistic manner two opposing principles which lie at the root of aH the phenomena of the universe. These principles are evidently the Demiurge on the one hand and the precosmical chaotic condition of the universe on the other. Both of them have reflections on the ethicallevel -the Good and the Evil respectively. But at the same time they are ontological principles and primary or secondary causes of aH phenomena existing in the universe and determining its nature 28 . We may admit so much that the divine principle has a highest ontological status, and so this seems to be a relative or mitigated dualism in which one principle is subordinated to the other. In this system, however, Demiurge (the active ordinat01J and Chaos (the passive ordinandum) "are and remain opposed to one another and cannot be derived from or reduced to each other,,29. The two principles seem to be also coeternal, in the sense that both of them exist and act from the very beginning. If we insist, as does U. Bianchi 30 , on the coeternality of the principles, disregarding the fact that they are not coequal, we may even consider Plato's dualism to be radical, notwithstanding the rejection that such an assertion wouId l'aise in many eminent Platonists.
